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We perform the first empirical study to focus on the relationship between trade protection and investment 
in R&D.  Our results support predictions from the theoretical literature that temporary tariffs stimulate 
R&D, although we find no evidence that this effect diminishes as the termination of protection 
approaches as predicted by some theoretical models.  We also find little evidence that quotas reduce R&D 
as predicted by multiple theoretical works.  Finally, our results indicate that temporary tariffs result in 
decreased capital investment, perhaps because firms use periods of temporary protection to shutdown 
unprofitable facilities.  This reveals an important distinction in firm behavior with regard to investment in 
tangible versus intangible capital during periods of trade protection. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
A commonly-cited justification for trade protection is that it can help domestic firms realize the cost 
savings stemming from the investment in physical capital and R&D that should take place during periods 
of temporary protection.  Insulation from the competitive global marketplace is apparently warranted 
since the efficiencies provided by increasing returns to scale and R&D may take considerable time to 
materialize.  Interestingly, there is almost no empirical work that tests whether firms actually increase 
investment in R&D during periods of trade relief.   The following paper is intended to help fill this hole in 
the literature. 
 
The success of multiple GATT rounds in lowering broadly-administered, long-term trade protection has 
shifted the focus of protection towards more narrowly defined circumstances, such as ‘dumping’, foreign 
subsidization, and patent infringement.
1  Most current protection, therefore, is based on the supposed need 
to offset unfair trade practices of foreign firms and governments, rather than achieving goals stemming 
from strategic trade or infant industry arguments.  Since the goal of these policies is to punish unfair trade 
practices, one might not necessarily expect any clear link between their implementation and domestic 
investment in R&D.  In contrast, we can more easily surmise a connection between R&D and safeguard 
protection, which is now the primary recourse for industries battered by fairly traded imports.
2  Instead of 
focusing on the misdeeds of foreign firms, domestic industries seeking safeguard protection are more 
fundamentally indicating that they need a period of respite in order to return to profitability.
3 The success 
of safeguards in returning firms to long-term health is in part based on the actions of these firms during 
their period of temporary protection.  One logical strategy would be to invest in R&D, especially since 
surviving globally competitive markets appears increasingly rooted in a firm’s ability to innovate and 
incorporate new technology.  However, a firm that is pessimistic about its ability to ever compete in the 
face of international competition might choose to avoid costly R&D.  Moreover, a firm that believes it 
can extend its period of protection may also choose to avoid investment in R&D, instead relying on the 
competitive advantage it receives from safeguards. 
 
In the following paper, we study the influence of trade protection in the form of safeguards on R&D 
expenditures during the period 1975-2005.  Besides incorporating frequently cited determinants such as 
                                                            
1 From 1945-2007, average tariffs in the US fell from 25% and to 3.2%.  The Trade Act of 1974 covers legislation 
concerning antidumping (section 731), countervailing duties (section 701), and intellectual property infringement 
(section 337), which serve to protect US firms from unfair pricing, illegal subsidization, and patent infringement by 
foreign firms.  See Section 19 U.S.C. §1671-1677 and 19 U.S.C. §1337. 
2 US Legislation covering safeguards is found in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.  See 19 U.S.C. §2251-2254 
and 19 U.S.C. §2451. 
3 In reality, firms pursuing safeguard protection often to claim that their difficulties stem from the illegal trade 
practices of foreign industries, as was witnessed in the steel safeguard case in 2002.  Firms may choose to pursue 
safeguard protection not because they believe foreign trade practices are fair, but instead because safeguard 
protection is more comprehensive than antidumping and countervailing protection. See Finger et al. (1985) for an 
analysis of a firm’s decision to seek safeguard protection versus antidumping and countervailing duty protection.   
From a statutory perspective, however, safeguards serve the function of protecting domestic industries from fairly 
traded imports, and therefore are more restrictive in certain ways.  First, they require more evidence of domestic 
injury than AD and CVD protection (“serious” injury versus “material” injury.)  Second, their maximum duration is 
generally four years, with the possibility of a four year extension, while AD and CVD protection can be extended for 
decades.  Finally, safeguards must be accompanied by offsetting trade compensation.  See Agreement of Safeguards, 
Article XIX of GATT 1994.      
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firm size, cash flow, and capital stock, we compare the impact of safeguards that were applied in the form 
of tariffs versus those that were implemented as quotas.  While there are numerous theoretical articles that 
study the distinct effects of tariffs and quotas on investment in R&D, we believe this to be the first 
empirical paper to test how these two different forms of protection actually impact R&D.  In sum, our 
results indicated that while temporary tariff protection results in an increase in R&D investment by firms, 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the imposition of temporary quota protection and 
R&D investment. 
 
In the following section, we provide an overview of the literature on the relationship between protection 
and R&D.  Section III discusses empirical models of R&D and the methodology used in this paper, while 
Section IV reviews the data and Section V presents our estimation method.  Empirical results are 
presented and discussed in section VI, while section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
In part of the strategic trade policy line of research that developed in the 1980s, Krugman (1984) 
illustrates that trade barriers, whether in the form of tariffs or quotas, could cause firms to increase 
investment in R&D.  In his model, R&D expenditures increase with the output of the firm because greater 
output generates more profits which can then be used to finance R&D.  Investment in cost-saving R&D 
reduces the marginal costs of the firm.  In this model, trade protection serves to increase the output of the 
domestic firm at the expense of its foreign competitors, thereby increasing R&D investment by domestic 
firms and reducing investment by its foreign competitors.  The cost advantage brought on by the R&D 
investment then allows the domestic firm to increase its market share in all markets even after domestic 
protection is removed. 
 
Subsequent theoretical studies, however, have found that the impact of protection on R&D could vary 
depending on the form of protection imposed, the form of competition in the industry, and the certainty 
with which protection is imposed.  We summarize some of these predictions in Table 1.   
 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), for example, illustrate that trade liberalization could potentially increase 
or decrease firm investment in R&D.  On the one hand, trade liberalization puts firms in different 
countries in direct competition with one another, thus giving them an incentive to pursue technological 
innovation in order to become more competitive.  On the other hand, firms facing increased competition 
from abroad experience a decrease in the profitability of their R&D investments, thus reducing their 
incentive to invest.  The authors find that policies that protect a country’s traditional manufacturing sector 
tend to reduce the number of innovative industries, while increasing total investment in R&D.   
 
In a seminal paper, Reitzes (1991) uses a model with two-stage Cournot competition to show that a tariff 
will lead to increased investment in cost-reducing R&D, while a quota reduces R&D.  Cabral et al. (1998) 
finds that quotas reduce R&D under Bertrand competition as well, so long as the quota is close to the free 
trade level.
4   If the quota becomes sufficiently binding, however, R&D will increase.  The authors point 
out that this last result is consistent with the frequently cited infant industry argument that quotas (and 
                                                            
4 Interestingly, R&D by the foreign duopolist is found to rise under such a quota, since the quantitative restriction 
removes the negative strategic impact of cost-reducing R&D.   
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other protection) can help spur domestic investment.  Bouet (2001) incorporates uncertainty with regard 
to the outcome of cost-reducing investment in his model of R&D.  He finds that under both Bertand and 
Cournot competition, quotas (in the form of VERs) reduce R&D, while tariffs increase R&D.   
 
Because we focus on temporary safeguard protection, our study most directly tests the predictions of 
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999), which analyzes the impact of temporary protection.  Miyagiwa and Ohno 
(1999) allow for uncertainty with regard to the duration of temporary protection in their model of R&D.  
They conclude that if the government policy is credible, tariff protection will stimulate investment in 
R&D; the optimal level of investment decreases towards the free-trade level as the end of protection 
approaches.  Restrictive quantitative protection can also cause firms to increase investment in R&D.  
However, if the government imposes a quantitative restriction that is not “sufficiently restrictive,” the 
level of investment will fall below the free-trade level, and then rise steadily to the free-trade level as the 
end of protection approaches.  These findings hold under both Cournot and Bertrand competition.   
 
Note that in the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) model, if the temporary protection is not credible--in other 
words, if the firm believes that such protection may be removed ahead of schedule if the firm increases its 
R&D or may be extended even the firm fails to invest in R&D--then temporary tariff protection may 
actually retard investment in cost-saving technology.   
 
Miyagiwa and Ohno’s (1999) results regarding quotas are consistent with most of the other theoretical 
articles cited above: quotas may deter domestic R&D.  These findings would suggest that industries that 
successfully negotiated VERs, such as autos and steel in the 1980s, may have engaged in less R&D, thus 
extending or deepening the technology gap that would result in future competitive failings with overseas 
producers.  They may have also led to the eventual need for safeguard protection, which the steel industry 
obtained in early 2002.
5      
There are very few empirical studies of the relationship between trade and investment in R&D.  Previous 
empirical studies focus on the relationship between the level of imports and R&D investment, rather than 
the impact of protection itself on R&D.  For example, Zietz and Fayissa (1992) estimate the impact of 
import penetration rates on firm R&D to sales ratios, using a panel of 20 manufacturing industries 
between 1972 and 1987.  They find that an increase in import competition leads to a rise in R&D 
expenditures, but only for high-tech industries. 
Scherer and Huh (1992) study the same relationship using a panel of 308 manufacturing firms between 
1971 and 1987.  They find that on average, firms decrease R&D in the short run when faced with 
increased import competition, although firm response varies significantly based on the size and level of 
diversification of the firm. 
   
Most recently, Funk (2003) uses a panel of manufacturing companies between 1979 and 1994 to estimate 
a simple neoclassical research investment model.   He attempts to explain firm-level R&D using, among 
other variables, the import penetration ratio and real exchange rate facing the firm.  He finds that firms 
                                                            
5 Safeguards for the steel industry were implemented in 2002. Tornell (1997) develops a model of rational 
disinvestment, and points to the US steel industry’s failure to the reinvest economic rents it obtained from trade 
protection during the 1970s and 1980s as evidence of such behavior.  
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with no foreign sales tend to decrease investment in R&D when faced with increased import competition, 
while exporting firms increase R&D investment in response to exchange rate depreciation. 
 
Of these three econometric studies, only Scherer and Huh (1992) control for trade protection in their 
empirical specifications of R&D.  Moreover, they combine safeguard and other types of protection into a 
single variable, making no distinction on the form of protection (tariff versus quantitative restrictions) or 
the type of protection (safeguards, VERs, antidumping and countervailing duties, etc.).
6  The failure of the 
authors to find strong evidence regarding any direct relationship between protection and R&D may be due 
to the amalgam nature of their trade barrier variable. We believe that our focus on a single policy 
(safeguards) allows us to more easily isolate the distinct effects of quota and tariff protection, which has 
been of particular interest in the theoretical literature.
7 
 
In short, our results indicate that tariffs lead to an increase in R&D, which is consistent with Reitzes 
(1991), Boulet (2001), as well as Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) under their assumption of a credible 
government policy. Our results also reveal a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between 
quota protection and R&D, which would otherwise have lent support to the theoretical predictions of 
Reitzes (1991), Boulet (2001), and Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999).  We note that in contrast to the other 
articles, Cabral, Kujal, and Petrakis (1998) predict that R&D would rise in response to sufficiently 
binding quotas.  As we discuss in the following sections, the lack of statistical significance of our quota 
variable may stem from the fact that quantitative safeguard protection has a differential impact on R&D 
investment depending on how restrictive the protection. 
 
III.  Empirical Models of R&D 
 
As discussed in Becker and Pain (2003), there is a large literature devoted to studying the impact of firm- 
and industry-specific factors, as well as various public policy variables, on R&D investment. Firm-
specific characteristics that have generated statistically significant coefficients include net profits, debt, 
and size (as measured by either sales or market power).  Cash flow has proven to be especially important 
in some studies, perhaps because imperfect capital markets prevent firms from raising sufficient outside 
funds to finance their R&D investment, thereby forcing them  to rely on limited internal funds.
8   
 
                                                            
6 By focusing on safeguard protection, we study the impact of trade relief that has been implemented specifically to 
protect firms from the serious damage caused by a surge in import flows.  Other forms of protection, such as 
antidumping and countervailing duties, protect firms from unfair trading practices of foreign firms and do not 
require evidence of serious damage due to increased import flows.  Since different forms of protection have different 
statutory requirements for implementation, it is quite possible that their application reflects different circumstances 
regarding foreign competition.  For example, countervailing duties indicate foreign subsidization and one might 
expect their implementation to have a different impact on domestic R&D than safeguards, which don’t necessarily 
involve illegal subsidization whatsoever. 
7 Other articles that shed light on the relationship between protection and R&D include Lenway et al. (1996) and 
Hartigan et al. (1986).  Lenway et al. (1996) show that US steel firms that were most active in lobbying for 
protection were also less innovative.  While this is not an explicit test on how protection impacts R&D, it clearly 
suggests that protection results in less investment in R&D.   Hartigan et al. (1986) uses event study methodology to 
show that shareholders of firms petitioning for safeguard protection have almost no reaction to critical decisions 
regarding the implementation of protection.  This suggests that investors do not believe that safeguards will increase 
future profits, perhaps because they assume that firms will fail to engage in efficiency-improving measures such as 
R&D while safeguards are in place.   
8 See, for example, Harnoff (2000) and Bond, Harnoff and Van Reenen (2006).  
6 
 
The most widely studied industry-level determinant of R&D investment is the degree of product market 
competition.  Theoretical models indicate that firms in competitive markets have more of a profit 
incentive to invest in R&D than those firms in more concentrated industries such as monopolies.  On the 
other hand, monopolies may want to preemptively discourage potential competitors from developing and 
patenting new technologies by investing more in R&D, thereby obtaining a lead in the race to obtain a 
patent.  Because theoretical models cannot determine which of these effects is stronger, the question of 
whether greater monopoly power leads to more or less innovation is an empirical one.  As discussed 
above, studies such as Scherer and Huh (1992) and Zietz and Fayissa (1994) specifically study the impact 
of foreign market competition on R&D investment with conflicting results. 
 
Finally, there is a large literature investigating the impact of various public policies, including tax credits 
and R&D subsidies, on investment levels.  Hall and Van Reenen (2000) provide an excellent overview of 
this literature.  To our knowledge this is the first empirical study of the impact of another set of public 
policy instruments that could theoretically stimulate investment: tariffs and quotas.   
 
There are nearly as many empirical methods to study firm-level investment in R&D as there are 
determinants of this investment.  For example, numerous researchers have attempted to estimate structural 
models of investment, such as q models or Euler equations, including Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and 
Blundell et al. (1992).
9  These empirical models have almost without fail been rejected, as they find an 
extremely weak relationship between investment and average q, have the wrong signs on many 
explanatory variables, and suggest an extremely slow speed of adjustment to the desired capital stock 
level. 
 
Because these structural models have performed so poorly, more recent empirical research of R&D 
investment have used a less structural approach, such as accelerator models or error correction models.  
As detailed in Harhoff (2000), investment accelerator models hypothesize that there is a relationship 
between the log of the firm’s output (yit), the user cost of capital (jit), and the log of the firm’s desired 
stock of capital (kit) in period t: 
 
  it it it j y a k σ − + = . (1) 
 
In this equation, the parameter σ represents the elasticity of substitution for a firm with a constant return 
to scale CES production function.  An approximation of the first difference of equation 1 is typically 
defined as: 
 









where δ is the rate of depreciation, Ii is firm investment, and Ki is the firm’s capital stock.  Empirical 
models of equation 2 typically measure the firm’s unobserved cost of capital as a function of time and 
firm dummy variables.  A corresponding R&D equation can be derived in a similar way by treating R&D 
and investment symmetrically. 
 
In the presence of adjustment costs, capital stock cannot adjust immediately to the target level of capital 
specified in equation 1.  As discussed in Bond et al. (2006), this adjustment process may be complex, and 
                                                            




should be determined by the data.  They suggest nesting equation 1, the long-run capital stock equation, 
with an autoregressive-distributed lag dynamic regression, such as: 
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This model can be re-written in error-correction form to separate the short-run from the long-run effects 
of output on investment as follows: 
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Our empirical model closely follows Bond et al. (2006) in assuming that the user cost of capital, j, can be 
controlled for using year- (µt) and firm-specific (ηi) effects.  Because previous research has found cash 
flow to be an important determinant of firm investment, we include current and lagged terms of the ratio 
of cash flow (Cit) to the beginning of the period capital stock, and approximate ∆kit in a manner identical 
to the approximation used in equation 2.  Unlike Bond et al. (2006), our primary variables of interest are 
those capturing the impact of temporary import protection in the form of safeguards.  Our estimating 
equation is: 
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where Tit is a dummy variable that equals one if the government has imposed temporary safeguard 
protection in the form of a tariff, Qit is a dummy variable that equals one of the government has imposed 
temporary safeguard protection in the form of a quota, and Yearsit is the number of years the safeguard 
protection has been imposed.   
 
We constrain the coefficient on yi,t-2 to equal 0, which is consistent with a long-run constant returns to 
scale production function.  The parameter θ should be less than zero if the hypothesis of “error 
correction” is correct.  In other words, if the capital stock is above its desired level, then future investment 
should be lower.  If the safeguard protection is credible and the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) model is 
correct, we would expect τ0>0 and τ1<0; credible but temporary tariff protection increases investment 
above the free-trade level, but the level of investment decreases towards the free-trade level as the end of 
protection approaches.  In contrast, under this same theoretical model, credible and non-binding quota 
safeguard protection would result in κ0<0 and κ1>0. 
 
Equations 1-5 detail an empirical model of investment.  We follow Bond et al. (2006) in treating R&D 
investment and capital investment nearly symmetrically.  Because firms do not provide any information 
on the value of R&D capital stock, we measure the change in R&D stock using annual R&D expenditures 
rather than approximating this change using the ratio of investment to capital stock.  Our estimating 
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where rit is the log of R&D expenditures.  The predictions for the parameters are identical to those 
discussed for equation 5.  
 
IV.  Data 
 
The United States imposed safeguard protection on 19 separate occasions between 1975 and 2005 for 
periods ranging from two to five years.  As can be seen from Table 2, safeguard protection took a number 
of forms during this time period, including tariffs, orderly marketing arrangements (OMA), tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQ), and quotas.  Although the United States awarded the most safeguard protection to the steel 
industry, other firms benefitting from protection include producers of such diverse products as lamb meat, 
clothespins, motorcycles, and wood shingles. 
 
According to information collected from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), slightly over 
280 firms benefitted from safeguard protection between 1975 and 2005.
10  Because we only observe R&D 
expenditures in the public companies included in the COMPUSTAT dataset, our sample includes just 20 
percent of the total list of beneficiaries, or 64 firms, which were public U.S. companies during their 
period of safeguard protection.  The list of these firms is included in Table 3. 
 
We collected financial data for each firm, including the value of their sales and R&D expenditures in each 
fiscal year, from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT North America dataset.  For each firm we include 
all available financial data between fiscal years 1970 through 2005; because each firm is observed only in 
those fiscal years in which it is included in the COMPUSTAT database, our final dataset is an unbalanced 
panel of 64 firms over periods ranging from 5 to 36 years.  A complete list of variable definitions is 
included in the Data Appendix.      
We account for escape clause protection using both dummy variables and time trend variables.  For 
example, the Tariff Dummy (T) equals one when tariff safeguard protection is in place for at least half of 
the firm’s fiscal year and the Quota Dummy (Q) is a similarly defined variable when the safeguard 
protection is in the form of a quota or orderly marketing arrangement.  The time trend variable interacted 
with both the Tariff and Quota dummy variable is calculated using the log of the number of years the 
protection has been in place.  In some specifications we define this as the number of years since the 
protection has been renewed.  Escape clause protection is typically imposed for between one and three 
years, but the protection can be renewed or extended by the President. 
                                                            
10 A list of firms benefitting from safeguard protection was compiled by the authors from the list of domestic firms 
included in the individual ITC reports associated with each escape clause investigation.  The list is available from 
the authors upon request.  
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We include an additional 690 control firms from the COMPUSTAT database that report the same primary 
four-digit Standardized Industrial Code (SIC) as the beneficiaries in the safeguard beneficiaries sample.  
There are 34 four-digit SIC codes represented in our sample. 
Table 4 includes summary statistics from both the beneficiary firm and control sample. 
V.  Estimation 
 
To estimate the dynamic regression models specified in equations 5 and 6 using an unbalanced panel of 
many firms with a small number of time periods, we use the system GMM estimator developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998).
11  In a dynamic panel, the unobserved panel level effects (ηi) are by 
construction correlated with the lagged dependent variables.  Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to deal with this endogeneity; moments are formed 
from the first differenced errors of the estimating equations and instruments.  Lagged levels of the 
dependent, predetermined, and endogenous variables are used as GMM-type instruments.  First-
differences of the strictly exogenous variables are used as standard instruments.   
 
The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator may perform poorly if the autoregressive process is too 
persistent; specifically, if the autoregressive process is too persistent then lagged levels of the dependent 
and endogenous variables are weak instruments.  The Arellano and Bond estimator may also suffer from 
weak instruments if the ratio of the variance of the panel effects to the variance of the idiosyncratic error 
(ε) is too large.  Blundell and Bond (1998) improve upon the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator by 
developing a system that uses additional moment conditions; these additional moment conditions come 
from using lagged differences of the model’s variables as instruments for the level equation.
12  The 
precise instruments that we use are reported in the notes to each table, but we basically use lags of all the 
firm-level variables in the model. 
 
The method requires that there be no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors.  We test this assumption 
using the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors.
13  We also test the 
validity of the moment conditions using the Sargan test of over-identifying conditions. 
 
VI.  Results 
 
We report the results from the R&D equation in Table 5.  Column 1 combines the dummy variables 
capturing the tariff and quota safeguard protection into a single dummy variable, Protection.  The 
specifications presented in columns 2 through 4 analyze the differential effects of tariff and quota 
safeguard protection on R&D investment, and explores whether the impact of such protection on 
investment changes over the period of protection, as theorized by Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999). 
 
As predicted by the model, the error correction term (the R&D to output ratio) is negative and significant 
in all of the specifications.  Both lags of the output growth terms are positive and statistically significant.  
Like many other studies, we find no significant impact of cash flow on R&D expenditures in any of our 
specifications.  Although not reported here, the parameter estimates from specifications excluding all 
safeguard protection variables are virtually identical to those presented in Table 5.  The Arellano-Bond 
                                                            
11 Although we observe some of the firms in our sample for as many as 36 years, most firms are observed for a 
much shorter time period and as few as five years. 
12 The model assumes that the panel-level effect is unrelated to the first observable first-difference of the dependent 
variable.   
13 The first difference of IID errors are auto-correlated; rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at orders 
higher than one implies that the moment conditions are misspecified.  
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diagnostic tests fail to find evidence of second-order serial correlation in the first differenced errors, while 
the Sargan diagnostic tests fail to reject the over-identifying restrictions in the model.  
 
The parameter estimates from the baseline specification presented in Column 1 indicate that firms 
significantly increase their R&D investment during the imposition of safeguard protection, suggesting 
that safeguard protection successfully encourages industries hurt by import surges to undertake 
readjustment measures to prepare for future international competition.   
 
As discussed above, however, the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) model predicts that while tariff protection 
stimulates investment in R&D, the optimal level of investment decreases towards the free-trade level as 
the end of protection approaches.  Intuitively, because of the tariff protection, the domestic firm earns 
higher profits from innovation; the earlier the discovery during the period of protection, the higher the 
stream of profits from the innovation, thus the firm has the highest incentive to innovate at the beginning 
of the safeguard protection.  In contrast, quantitative restrictions may or may not have the same positive 
impact on R&D investment.  If the government imposes quantitative restriction that are not “sufficiently 
restrictive,” the level of investment is below the free-trade level, and rises steadily to the free-trade level 
as the end of protection approaches.  In this case, the new technology is actually less profitable under a 
quota than during free trade.  We explore the possible differential impact of tariff and quota protection on 
R&D investment in the specifications reported in columns 2 through 4. 
  
We find strong evidence that firms increase R&D investment when tariff safeguard protection is imposed 
in all three specifications, as predicted by Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999), Reitzes (1991), and Boulet (2001).  
However, we find no evidence that this increase in investment decreases over the period of protection, as 
reported in columns 2 and 4.  We tried a variety of specifications for the time trend variable, but all results 
were qualitatively the same as those presented here.
14  It is important to note, however, that the empirical 
results do not necessarily reject the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) hypothesis, which specifically models the 
impact of temporary protection with a credible removal date.  In reality, firms may realistically expect 
that the safeguard protection will be renewed for an indefinite amount of time; of the 19 instances of 
safeguard protection considered in this research, 11 were renewed at least one time by the federal 
government for periods ranging from six months to three years.
15  Moreover, it may be the case that R&D 
projects are not generally undertaken in less than a two or three year period and require a constant stream 
of funding during this time.  Furthermore, R&D projects that yield promising early results may result in 
increased spending.  Thus, there is reason to expect that R&D spending would not diminish to any 
significant degree as the termination of protection approaches, despite the predictions of Miyagiwa and 
Ohno (1999). 
 
Although the parameter estimates associated with our quantitative restrictions are negative, as predicted 
by Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) if restrictions are not sufficiently binding, the estimates are statistically 
insignificant.  The insignificance of these parameters may be due to the fact that while many of the 
safeguard quantitative restrictions imposed by the government over the years have been non-binding 
(resulting in a decrease in R&D investment), other periods of temporary quantitative barriers have been 
binding enough to encourage an increase in R&D investment.   
 
A review of the seven periods of quantitative safeguard restrictions imposed by the United States between 
1975 and 2001 suggests this may be the case.  For example, in 1998 the United States imposed 
quantitative restrictions on U.S. imports of wheat gluten.  As reported by the U.S. International Trade 
                                                            
14 For example, in various specifications we defined the time trend as a simple linear trend (number of years of 
protection) and accounted for the possibility that firms could readjust their R&D investment strategy following the 
renewal of temporary safeguard protection. 
15 In contrast, the steel safeguards imposed in 2002 were removed prior to their schedule elimination date.    
11 
 
Commission (2001), the quota fill rates from individual countries reached or exceeded 100 percent in the 
first year of protection.  However, a number of our most important trading partners (including Canada and 
Mexico) were excluded from the quota which limited its effectiveness.  Similarly, the United States 
restricted imports of footwear from Taiwan and Korea in 1977.  However, during the period of safeguard 
protection, the United States experienced a growth in imports of footwear from other countries and 
producers in Taiwan and Korea were able to change their designs in order to avoid the quota (U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office (1986)).  In contrast, the U.S. General Accounting Office (1989) reported 
that the quota program established for stainless and other steel products in 1983 and 1984, “helped 
contain the import surge at its peak, contributing to the decline in import market share in 1985.”  Orderly 
Marketing Agreements were negotiated with 19 countries, and in 1985 steel imports from countries bound 
by these quotas equaled 102.9 percent of the aggregate total of quotas, suggesting that the quotas were 
highly restrictive.  Given the varying levels of restrictiveness of the quantitative restrictions, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the coefficients measuring the impact of quantitative restrictions on R&D investment 
are insignificant. 
 
Sensitivity analysis suggests that these results are fairly robust to our sample of firms.  For example, in 
specifications not reported here we found no evidence that firms characterized as highly R&D intensive 
reacted differently to safeguard protection when compared to others.
16  In another specification we 
excluded all firms from the electronic and electrical equipment industry (SIC 36), which accounted for 
half of our sample; the results were qualitatively the same as those presented here. 
 
We report the results from the investment equation in Table 6.  As before, column 1 combines the dummy 
variables capturing the tariff and quota safeguard protection into a single dummy variable, Protection.  
The specifications presented in columns 2 through 4 analyze the differential effects of tariff and quota 
safeguard protection on investment, and explores whether the impact of such protection on investment 
changes over the period of protection, as predicted by the Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999) model. 
 
As in the R&D equation, the error correction term (the investment to output ratio) is negative and 
significant in all of the specifications while both lags of the output growth terms are positive and 
statistically significant.  Surprisingly, the coefficient on lagged cash flow is actually negative and 
significant, indicating not only does a lack of cash flow not retard investment, it actually increases it.  
Although it is unclear what is driving this surprising result, it is not driven by the inclusion of the 
protection variables; results were virtually identical in unreported specifications excluding the protection 
variables. 
 
The coefficient estimates associated with the impact of safeguard protection on capital investment are 
markedly dissimilar to those from the R&D specifications.  Unlike with R&D, we find no statistically 
significant impact of safeguard protection on capital investment, as reported in column 1.  Unlike the 
R&D specification, parameter estimates reported in column 2 and 3 suggest that capital investment 
actually decreases during periods of tariff safeguard protection, in direct contrast to the results in all of 
the theoretical models discussed in Section 2.
17 
 
What could be causing this surprising result?  First, it is important to note that the theoretical models 
discussed in Section 2 deal specifically with firm investment in R&D or cost-saving technologies.  We are 
aware of no theoretical models that specifically study the impact of temporary protection on capital 
investment and, particularly, investment in such things as capacity levels.   
 
                                                            
16 We define highly R&D intensive firms as those with an R&D to sales ratio in the top 25 percent of the sample. 




Indeed, in order to qualify for safeguard protection, firms need to show that they have been seriously 
injured by increased imports; one statistical measure that the U.S. International Trade Commission relies 
upon is the capacity utilization rate.  For example, U.S. International Trade Commission reports indicate 
that the wheat gluten industry had a capacity utilization rate of 54.3 percent when safeguard protection 
was imposed in 1998, while the line pipe industry had a capacity utilization rate of 55.6 percent when 
their protection was imposed in 2000.  It seems perfectly reasonable for firms to choose not to expand 
capacity through capital investment given these conditions.  Indeed, one way of improving 
competitiveness could be to disinvest in unprofitable enterprises or products, thus resulting in a decrease 
in the desired capital stock level.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may have happened in some 
industries.  For example, the adjustment plan of the broom corn broom industry included investment in 
robotic technology to produce wire-wound brooms automatically.  When this technology failed to become 
available, many firms either reduced or eliminated their production of broom corn brooms (U.S. 
International Trade Commission (1999)). 
 
 In summary, the results provide strong evidence that firms increase their investment in R&D during 
periods of temporary tariff protection as predicted by a number of theoretical models, but there is little 
evidence that this protection positively impacts capital protection.  Moreover, quantitative restrictions do 
not appear to have the same positive impact on R&D investment as tariffs. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
We believe this study to be the first empirical work focusing on the relationship between trade protection 
and R&D, despite the existence of numerous theoretic articles exploring this same subject.  We analyze 
the impact of U.S. safeguards imposed during 1975-2005 on investment in R&D, distinguishing between 
measures that were applied in the form of quotas versus those implemented as tariffs.  Safeguards are 
particularly appropriate to study such a relationship since they grant firms temporary relief from fairly 
traded imports and indicate a need to adjust strategies that will help firms return to competitiveness 
(rather than to offset unfair foreign trade practices such as dumping and foreign subsidization).  
Increasing R&D is one reasonable strategy that injured firms might employ during their period of 
temporary protection, although the theoretical literature suggests that tariff measures would be more 
likely to stimulate R&D than quota protection.  Our results seem to confirm these predictions.  
 
We follow Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999), which focuses on temporary protection, and employ the system 
GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to test whether tariffs and quotas impact R&D, 
and also whether such affects trail off as the end of protection approaches.  Our results indicate that tariffs 
result in increased R&D spending, although we find no evidence that this effect wears off as the 
termination date nears.  We also find no statistically significant link between quantitative protection and 
R&D, although the coefficient on the quota variable is negative, consistent with multiple theoretic works 
which suggest that quotas result in reduced R&D.  The insignificant quota coefficient may stem from the 
fact that in some cases quotas were non-binding, which would result in reduced R&D according to 
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999), while in other cases quotas were binding, leading to the opposite outcome.  
These opposing effects, therefore, may have cancelled each other out, resulting in the insignificant quota 
coefficient. 
 
Finally, our results indicate that firms respond to safeguard tariffs by reducing capital investment.  This is 
opposite of our findings regarding tariffs and R&D, and may be due to the fact that injured firms use their 
period of temporary protection to shut down inefficient facilities and unprofitable ventures.   We believe  
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this result to be an important finding, for it suggests that firms treat investment in tangible capital 
differently from investment in intangible capital, at least during periods of trade protection.  This matter 
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Our sample includes 64 escape clause beneficiary firms and 690 control firms from the same four- digit 
SIC codes as the beneficiary firms.  All financial data is from the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT 
North America database. The sample includes data from fiscal years 1970-2005, although each individual 
firm is observed only in those years in which it appears in the COMPUSTAT database, ranging from 5 to 
36 years.  This Appendix briefly describes the variables included in the analysis, their COMPSTAT 
definitions, and information on how the COMPUSTAT data was adjusted by the authors.  COMPUSTAT 
North America data item names for each variable are included in brackets.   
Research and Development (R).  All costs incurred during the year related to the development of new 
products or services in millions of dollars [XRD].  Data is adjusted for inflation using the input price 
index for R&D investment produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Investment (I).  Cash outflow used for additions to the company's property, plant and equipment, 
excluding amounts arising from acquisitions, in millions of dollars [CAPX].  Data is adjusted for inflation 
using the SIC-based producer price indexes produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Output (Y).  Gross sales minus discounts and returned sales for which credit is given to customers in 
millions of dollars [SALE].  Data is adjusted for inflation using the SIC-based producer price indexes 
produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Cashflow (C).  Income after all expenses (but before dividends) before depreciation, in millions of dollars 
[IB + DP].  Data is adjusted for inflation using the SIC-based producer price indexes produced by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Capital Stock (K).  Capital stock is computed by adjusting the historic capital stock data from 
COMPUSTAT for inflation using the SIC-based producer price index produced by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (P
SIC); the COMPUSTAT variable is defined as the cost, before accumulated depreciation, of 
tangible fixed property used in the production of revenue, in millions of dollars [PPENT].  We apply a 
perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate (δ) of 8 percent for all years following the first year 
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Tariff Dummy (T).  Dummy variable that equals one when tariff safeguard protection is imposed.  We 
define firms as receiving safeguard protection only if the safeguard was in place for at least half of the 
firm’s fiscal year. 
Quota Dummy (Q).  Dummy variable that equals one when safeguard protection in the form of a quota or 
orderly marketing arrangement is imposed.  We define firms as receiving safeguard protection only if the 
safeguard was in place for at least half of the firm’s fiscal year. 
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201-005  Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel 6/14/1976  2/13/1980  3.7  Quota,  OMA 
201-018 Footwear  7/28/1977 6/30/1981  3.9  OMA 
201-019 Television  Receivers  7/1/1977 6/30/1982  5.0  OMA 
201-029  CB Radio Receivers  3/27/1978 4/11/1981  3.0  Tariff 
201-035  High-carbon ferrochromium 
  11/3/1978 11/13/1981  3.0 Tariff 
201-036 Clothespins  2/18/1979 2/22/1984  5.0  Quota 
201-037  Bolts, nuts, and screws of iron or steel  12/26/1978 1/5/1982  3.0  Tariff 
201-039 Non-electric  cookware  1/17/1980 1/16/1984  4.0  Tariff 
201-043 Mushrooms  11/1/1980 10/31/1983  3.0 Tariff 
201-047  Heavyweight motorcycles 
  4/1/1983 10/9/1987  4.5 TRQ 
201-048  Stainless steel and alloy tool steel  7/19/1983 9/1/1989  6.1  TRQ, OMA 
201-051  Carbon and certain alloy steel products 10/1/1984 9/31/1989 5.0  OMA 
201-056  Wood shingles and shakes  7/6/1986 6/1/1991  4.9  Tariff 
201-065  Broom corn brooms  11/28/1996 12/3/1998  2.0  Tariff 
201-067  Wheat gluten 
  5/30/1998 6/1/2001  3.0 Quota 
201-068 Lamb  meat  7/7/1999 11/15/2001  2.4  TRQ 
201-069  Certain steel wire rod  3/1/2000 3/1/2003  3.0  TRQ 
201-070  Circular welded carbon quality line pipe  3/1/2000 3/1/2003  3.0  Tariff 






Public Firms Benefitting from Safeguard Protection, 1975-2005 
Company Case 
AK Steel Holding Company  201-070, 201-073 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp.  201-048 
Anchor Hocking Corp.  201-039 
Andrea Electronics Corp.  201-019 
Archer Daniels Midland Co.  201-067 
Armco Inc.  201-005, 201-048, 201-051 
Babcock & Wilcox Co.  201-005 
Barry (R G) Corp.  201-018 
Bethlehem Steel Corp.  201-005, 201-037, 201-048, 201-051 
Buell Industries Inc.  201-037 
Carpenter Technology Corp.  201-005, 201-048, 201-073 
Corning Inc.  201-039 
Crucible Inc.  201-005 
Ekco Group Inc.  201-039 
Elco Industries, Inc.  201-037 
Emhart Corp.  201-037 
Fairchild Industries, Inc.  201-037 
Federal Screw Works  201-037 
General Electric Co.  201-019 
General Housewares  201-039 
GTE Corp.  201-019 
Harley-Davidson Inc.  201-047 
Interlake Corp.  201-035, 201-051 
IPSCO Inc.  201-070, 201-073 
Ispat Inland Inc.  201-069, 201-073 
Jones & Laughlin Industries, Inc.  201-005 
Kaiser Steel Corp.  201-005 
Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc.  201-051, 201-069 
Lancaster Colony Corp.  201-039 
Leggett & Platt Inc.  201-073 
Lincoln Logs Ltd.  201-056 
LTV Corp.  201-070 
Lukens Inc.  201-051 
McRae Industries  201-018 
Midwest Grain Products, Inc.  201-067 
Mirro Corp.  201-039 
Mite Corp.  201-037 
Monogram Industries  201-037 
Motorola, Inc.  201-019 
National Steel Corp.  201-051 
Official Industries, Inc.  201-018 
Pathcom, Inc.  201-029 
Penn Engraving and Manufacturing Corp.  201-037 





Table 3, Continued 
Public Firms Benefitting from Safeguard Protection, 1975-2005 
Company Case 
RCA Corp.  201-019 
RELM Wireless Corp.  201-029 
Republic Steel Corp.  201-005 
Revere Copper & Brass Inc.  201-039 
Rexnord Holdings. Inc.  201-037 
Sony Corp. of America  201-019 
SPS Technologies Inc.  201-037 
Standex International Corp.  201-039 
Suave Shoe Corp.  201-018 
Timken Co.  201-005, 201-048, 201-073 
Union Carbide Corp.  201-035 
U.S. Steel Corp.  201-005, 201-037, 201-048, 201-051, 201-
070, 201-073 
VSI Corp.  201-037 
Wear-Ever Proctor Silex Inc.  201-039 
WEJ-IT Corp.  201-037 
Wellco Enterprises  201-018 
Wells-Gardner Electronic Corp.  201-019 
Weyerhaeuser Co.  201-056 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.  201-037 







 Mean  Std.  Error  Min  Max 
 Safeguard  Beneficiaries 
R&D 137.56 527.80 0.00  4,947.00
Investment 340.09 1,212.56 0.00  15,520.00
Sales 3,999.84 12,440.91 0.00  151,802.00
Cashflow 425.92 1,852.78 -4,418.00  27,171.00
Capital Stock  1,719.76 5,103.00 0.00  67,528.00
Years of Tariff Safeguard Protection 
per Firm 
0.11 0.14 0.00 0.66
Years of Quantitative Safeguard 
Protection per Firm 
0.10 0.18 0.00 1.00
Years in Sample   20.11 11.20 2.00  36.00
Number of Firms  64  
        
 Control  Firms 
R&D 73.77 425.80 0.00  6,286.73
Investment 244.47 1,361.75 0.00  65,028.00
Sales 2,014.04 7,871.32 -5.81  105,672.00
Cashflow 302.94 1,625.39 -50,579.50  28,569.00
Capital Stock  1,421.94 7,083.57 0.00  128,063.00
Years in Sample  11.86 8.85 1.00  36.00
Number of Firms  694  




The Impact of Safeguard Protection on R&D 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
∆rit-1  -0.066* -0.067*  -0.068*  -0.068* 
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
∆yt 0.105*  0.108*  0.108*  0.107* 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
∆yt-1  0.094*   0.096*  0.096*  0.096* 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Ct / Kt-1  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ct-1 / Kt-2  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
(r-y)t-2  -0.022* -0.023*  -0.024*  -0.024* 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Protectiont 0.091*       
 (0.039)       
Protectiont*Log(Yearst) -0.037       
 (0.041)       
Tarifft   0.124*  0.144*   
   (0.050)  (0.042)   
Tarifft*Log(Yearst)   0.032    0.100* 
   (0.050)    (0.042) 
Quotat   -0.011  -0.067   
   (0.039)  (0.060)   
Quotat*Log(Yearst)   -0.067    -0.081 
   (0.048)    (0.053) 
        
Sargan (p-value)  0.379  0.378  0.378  0.414 
LM(1) -9.455  -9.457  -9.453  -9.465 
LM(2) -1.380  -1.352  -1.357  -1.351 
Observations 6,438  6,438  6,438  6,438 
Firms 630  630  630  630 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates those coefficients significant at the 95 percent level.  
A full set of year dummy variable is included in each specification.  Sargan is the Sargan-Hansen test of 
the over-identifying restrictions.  LM(k) is the Arellano-Bond test statistic for k
th order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced errors.  Instruments used include ∆rt-3 to ∆rt-6, ∆yt-3 to ∆yt-6 and Ct-3/Kt-4 to Ct-6/Kt-5 




The Impact of Safeguard Protection on Investment 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
It/Kt-1  -0.021 -0.023  -0.022  -0.020 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
∆yt 0.209*  0.208*  0.208*  0.209* 
 (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
∆yt-1  0.242* 0.242*  0.241*  0.243* 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Ct / Kt-1  -0.007* -0.007*  -0.008*  -0.008* 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Ct-1 / Kt-2  0.004 0.004  0.004  0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
(r-y)t-2  -0.212* -0.212*  -0.212*  -0.212* 
 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Protectiont 0.093       
 (0.095)       
Protectiont*Log(Yearst) -0.084       
 (0.072)       
Tarifft   -0.056**  -0.037**   
   (0.031)  (0.020)   
Tarifft*Log(Yearst)   0.026    -0.006 
   (0.031)    (0.020) 
Quotat   0.253  0.092   
   (0.210)  (0.089)   
Quotat*Log(Yearst)   -0.191    -0.057 
   (0.151)    (0.048) 
        
Sargan (p)  0.161  0.170  0.180  0.151 
LM(1) -6.196  -6.357  -6.204  -6.095 
LM(2) -0.886  -0.912  -0.895  -0.862 
Observations 6,967  6,967  6,967  6,967 
Firms 505  505  505  505 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** indicates those coefficients significant at the 95 and 90 
percent level, respectively.  A full set of year dummy variable is included in each specification.  Sargan is 
the Sargan-Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions.  LM(k) is the Arellano-Bond test statistic for 
k
th order serial correlation in the first-differenced errors.  Instruments used include It-3/Kt-4 to It-6/Kt-7, ∆yt-3 
to ∆yt-6 and Ct-3/Kt-4 to Ct-6/Kt-5 in the differenced equations and the lagged difference of It/Kt-1, ∆yt, and 
Ct-1/Kt-2 in the levels equations. 
 
 
 